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In this second and final part of his article, Julian Farrand, Pensions 
Ombudsman, examines the question of courts versus the Pensions 
Ombudsman, drawing on his (sometimes unfortunate) personal 
experiences with appeals against the Ombudsman's determinations.
T hat the Pensions Ombudsman might well be feared as a wolf in sheep's clothing emerges clearly from his original statutory functions and powers: in relation to personal 
and occupational pension schemes, the Ombudsman 'may 
investigate and determine (1) any complaint ... that [the 
complainant] has sustained injustice in consequence of 
maladministration [and/or] (2) any dispute of fact or law' (see 
the Pension Schemes Act 1993 ('PSA 1993'), s. 146, elaborately 
extended by the Pensions Act 1995, s. 157 as recommended by the 
Pension Law Review (PLR) Committee).
It may be worth noting that almost all my cases are treated as 
complaints within (1) rather than disputes within (2), although 
in practice the determination of a complaint will almost always 
incidentally call for the determination of a dispute. This renders 
the supervision of the Council on Tribunals a little unclear, since 
it is specifically confined to disputes within (2) (see Social Security 
Act 1990, s. 12(2)). It should also be noted that the word 'may' 
must confer a discretion to decline a case. Further, the vital 
words 'injustice' and 'maladministration' are left undefined. All 
of this drafting is derived from the Parliamentary and Local 
Commissioners' legislation, so that reference should be made for 
guiding precedents to two or three judicial decisions relating to 
them (e.g. Re Fletcher's Application [1970] 2 All ER 527 CA as to 
discretion not to investigate; R v Local Commissioner Jor 
Administration ex pane Bradford CC [1979] 1 QB 287 CA as to 
'maladministration' having an 'open-ended' meaning and as to 
formulating complaints for complainants; and R v Commissioner 
for Local Administration ex parte Eastleigh Borough Council [1988] 3 
All ER 151 CA as to 'injustice' being a broad concept covering 
expense and inconvenience and as to an ombudsman's report 
being neither a statute nor a judgment and not intended to 
undergo microscopic and legalistic analysis).
In the course of an investigation, the Pensions Ombudsman is 
specifically subject to a number of procedural provisions and 
rules PSA 1993, s. 149 and 1995 Rules). These are similar to 
those governing tribunals, requiring opportunities to comment 
on allegations and putting (some may think) an undue emphasis 
on oral hearings. However, apart from these provisions and rules:
' ... the procedure Jor conducting such an investigation shall be such 
as the Pensions Ombudsman considers appropriate in the circumstances 
of the case; and he may, in particular, obtain information from such 
persons and in such manner, and make such inquiries, as he thinks fit.' 
(PSA 1993, s. 149(4))
This makes it perfectly plain that the Pensions Ombudsman's 
role is not purely adversarial but, additionally, inquisitorial. 
Indeed, non-co-operation with his investigations, without lawful 
excuse, can be punished as if contempt of court PSA 1993, s. 
150). The Pensions Ombudsman, to assist him in any 
investigation, can also obtain advice from any person who in his 
opinion is qualified to give it (ibid).
DIRECTIONS
The crucial difference compared with the Public Ombudsmen 
is that their investigations merely lead to recommendations. The 
Pensions Ombudsman, on the other hand, has teeth. These are 
supplied by the PSA 1993, s. 151 (as amended in 1995) by virtue 
of which his directions are not only binding and enforceable but 
appear virtually unlimited as to monetary amounts or, indeed, 
anything else:
'Where the Pensions Ombudsman makes a determination ...he may 
direct any person responsible for the management of the scheme ...to 
take, or refrain from taking, such steps as he may specify ...'.
To a non-lawyer, these words no doubt appear to be pretty 
plain English for a statutory provision. They are taken, with 
added emphasis, from the PSA 1993, s. 151(2) as amended by 
the Pensions Act 1995, s. 157(10). The 'steps' are not restricted 
by any reference to legal 'fancy dancing' (cf. Deputy Prime 
Minister John Prescott's instructions to his lawyers in regard to 
settling the bus pensioners' dispute without litigation).
A lawyer will also note not only the omission of any statutory 
definition of 'steps' limiting or enlarging its ordinary meaning, 
but also the absence of any explanation or restriction of the sort 
expressly applied pre-determination:
'(2) For the purposes of any such investigation the Pensions 
Ombudsman shall have the same powers as the court in respect of
Amicus Curiae Issue 27 May 2000
the attendance and examination of witnesses (including the 
administration of oaths and affirmations and the examination of 
witnesses abroad) and in respect of the production of documents.
(3) No person shall be compelled for the purposes of any such 
investigation to give any evidence or produce any document which he 
could not be compelled to give or produce in civil proceedings before 
the court...
(8) In this section 'the court' means  
(a) in England and Wales, a county court;
(b) in Scotland, the sheriff.'
These references to what the courts can do are in the 
preceding section (PSA 1993, s. 150, emphasis supplied) and not 
reiterated as to 'steps'.
A lawyer might additionally appreciate a comparison with 
discrimination, sexual or racial: not actionable at common law, 
but by statute they 'may be made the subject of civil proceedings 
in like manner as any other claim in tort' (Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 ('SDA 1975'), s. 66(1) and Race Relations Act 1976 ('RRA 
1976'), s. 57(1)). Jurisdiction was conferred on industrial 
tribunals (as employment tribunals were then known) to order a 
respondent to pay compensation 'of an amount corresponding 
to any damages he could have been ordered by a county court... 
to pay to the complainant' (SDA 1975, s. 65(l)(b) and RRA 
1976, s. 56(l)(b)). Then in the county court 'all such remedies 
shall be obtainable ... as ... would be obtainable in the High 
Court' (s. 66(2) and 57(2) respectively). The PSA 1993 contains 
no cross-references, restrictive or otherwise, to what could be 
ordered or obtained in the courts. The Ombudsman's 'steps' 
were left unhobbled.
Discrimination is comparable with the Pensions 
Ombudsman's principal concern   'injustice in consequence of 
maladministration'   in that at common law it was not 
justiciable, so that, statute apart, there were no orders, or 'steps', 
that a court could direct as a remedy.
'Investigation of maladministration ... is not the normal function of 
a court. Maladministration as such does not give rise to a cause of 
action in law. In this respect [the Pensions Ombudsman] is acting 
in a manner similar to that of so-called 'ombudsmen' under other 
statutes, for example the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
or the Local Commissioners for Administration.'
(per Carnwath J in Miller v Stapleton [1996] 2 All ER 449 at 
p.462; see also per Schieman J in R v Knowsley MBC ex pane 
Maguire (1992) 90 LGR 653 at p. 664, quoted on p. 3 of Part I 
of this article, Amicus Curiae, Issue 26, April 2000). Nor does the 
PSA 1993 refer to 'injustice in consequence of 
maladministration' as being 'any other claim in tort' (cf. the 
discrimination statutes): thus pensions wrongdoing is obviously 
enough strictly sui generis (i.e. of its own kind).
As Lightman J rather lately appreciated, the PSA 1993:
"... is social legislation designed to improve the legal protection 
available to members of schemes in two ways: (a) it affords a cheap 
summary and informal alternative to proceedings in the ordinary courts; 
and (b) it affords recourse whenever injustice has been caused by 
maladministration whether or not the maladministration constitutes a 
civil wrong and accordingly whether or not there is an available remedy
in private law. '(Westminster City Council v Haywood (No. 2), 
20 December 1999, transcript para. 18)
He added his own view that 'the 1993 Act does something less 
than create new private rights and duties' (loc. tit., emphasis 
added), evidently considering that this does not necessarily 
follow from the provision of redress for 'reprehensible conduct' 
where there was and is none otherwise. This 'reprehensible 
conduct' (aka 'maladministration') did not, he thought, really 
involve novel duties and liabilities 'since standards have always 
been expected of those who manage schemes (still loc. tit). 
Incidentally it may be thought instructive to compare and 
contrast the enlightened attitude exhibited in this case with that 
displayed by (the same) Lightman J in Observation V below.
It follows, on the face of it, that the Pensions Ombudsman, 
having investigated the alleged maladministration, has a statutory 
power to direct 'steps' regardless of what the courts could or 
would do. He is free to think instead of the sort of steps that 
other statutory ombudsmen recommend, after all their statutes 
are patently precedents for the drafting of his (see Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1967, s. 5(1 )(a) and Local Government Act 1974, 
s. 26(1)). The difference, significant more in principle than in 
practice, is that they merely make recommendations whereas his 
direction as to 'steps' are final, binding, enforceable and 
appealable on points of law (see PSA 1993, s. 151 as amended 
by Pensions Act 1995, s. 157).
Originally the suggestion was proffered that such steps must 
be implicitly limited to redressing the injustice complained 
about as caused by maladministration (see 'Pensions 
Ombudsman v Courts   a curious case', a PL lecture published 
in Pension Lawyer No. 63, March 1995 at p. 3, but adding, in 
effect, that they might be required to be taken by persons not 
responsible for causing the maladministration). Subsequently 
this suggestion seemed to be enthusiastically endorsed by Lord 
Justice Millet:
PROCEDURE AND POWER
'... the procedurefor conducting such an investigation shall be such as 
the Pensions Ombudsman considers appropriate in the circumstances of 
the case; and he may, in particular, obtain information from such 
persons and in such manner, and make such inquiries, as he thinks fit. ' 
(Pension Schemes Act 1993, s. 149(4)):
... For the purposes of any such investigation the Pensions Ombudsman 
shall have the same powers as the court in respect of the attendance 
and examination of witnesses (including the administration of oaths 
and affirmations and the examination of witnesses abroad) and in 
respect of the production of documents.' (s. 150, emphasis added)
'Although not stated in terms, it is implicit that the steps in question 
must be calculated to provide an appropriate remedy for the injustice 
sustained by the complainant.' (Westminster City Council v Haywood 
[1998] Ch 377 CA at p. 410)
However, the idea of restricting steps to redressing injustice 
has now been undermined by amendments enabling the 
Ombudsman to investigate certain complaints of 
maladministration even though no injustice whatsoever was 
alleged   i.e. employers v trustees (or managers) or vice versa 
(see Pensions Act 1995, s. 157(2) amending Pensions Schemes Act,
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s. 146(l)(b)). The power to direct steps remains available to the 
Ombudsman without any restriction being indicated.
Another suggested limitation might be that, in so far as the
oo o '
steps are enforceable 'in a county court as if it were a judgment 
or order of that court', it follows that county court jurisdictional 
limits apply (see PSA 1993, s. 151(5)(a)). That would, however, 
only be true for England and Wales (plus, as it happens, 
Northern Ireland). In Scotland, in contrast, enforcement is 'by 
the sheriff, as if it were a judgment or order of the sheriff and 
whether or not the sheriff could himself have granted such judgment or 
order' (see s. 151(5)(b); emphasis added to clarifying words 
inserted, presumably, by a different   Scottish   Parliamentary 
draftsman). However, this suggested limitation has never been 
argued, even in relation to enforcement. One explanation may 
be that any steps directed would still be binding so as to found a 
cause of action in the High Court.
STEPS
Where the Pensions Ombudsman makes a determination ...he may 
direct any person responsible Jbr the management of the scheme ...to 
take, or refrain from taking, such steps as he may specify ...'. 
(Pensions Schemes Act 1993, s. 151(2) as amended by the 
Pensions Act 1995, s. 157(10), emphasis added)
A genuine limitation on the apparently unlimited power of the 
Pensions Ombudsman as to the steps he directs unarguably is 
that he must not be thought 'perverse' in the familiar Wednesbury 
sense (see the seminal passages reproduced in Edge v Pensions 
Ombudsman [1999] 4 All ER 546 at pp. 568-9 CA). Essentially, 
the test to justify judicial interference should be: 'was the step so 
unreasonable that no reasonable Ombudsman could ever have directed it?' 
Apart from this long-stop control, the choice of steps to direct 
would properly appear untrammelled.
JEALOUS JUDICIARY?
However, Her Majesty's judges have looked upon 'such steps as 
he may specify' with displeasure. Witness the following half-dozen 
or so observations on appeals (ostensibly on points of law) 
against determinations of the Pensions Ombudsman, quoted in 
chronological order:
/ 'The distress and inconvenience for which the ombudsman awarded 
£750 appears to be nothing more than the natural result of the 
disagreement between the trustees and Mr Stapleton as to the ejfect cf 
the so-called 'guarantee. ' If that had been dealt with by a court, and if 
Mr Stapleton's position had been upheld, he would not have been 
awarded anything for the inconvenience and anxiety inevitably involved 
in litigation. The courts have taken the view that that is not a proper 
head of compensation, even where a cause of action is established. There 
is no reason why a complainant should be better off because a dispute 
happens to be litigated before the ombudsman rather than before a 
court.
This was said by Carnwath J in Miller v Stapleton [ 1996] 2 All 
ER 449 (at p. 465) and illustrates a common attitude. Despite 
his own earlier recognition of the similarity of the Pensions 
Ombudsman to the public ombudsmen rather than the courts 
(at p. 462), no judicial (or other) notice was taken of their 
practice in recommending 'consolatory' or 'botheration' 
awards. As to this practice, the Parliamentary Ombudsman's 
Select Committee has given its approval, observing:
'We see no relevance in the lack of legal entitlement to the question 
cf appropriate redress ... The obligations of equity remain.' (para. 36, 
First Report, 'Maladministration and Redress', Session 
1994-95).
And as to being better off with ombudsmen in preference to 
the courts, see per Rose LJ in R v Insurance Ombudsman ex pane 
Aegon Life Assurance Ltd [1995] LRLR 101 at pp. 105-6 (quoted 
in Part I of this article, Amicus Curiae, Issue 26, April 2000, p. 7, 
para. (10)).
// 'But there is in my judgment a gap in the reasoning cfthe 
decision between the conclusion of maladministration and the 
compensation directed. Compensation for negligent misrepresentation (to 
which the Pensions Ombudsman equated the maladministration) should 
put the plaintiff in the same position as if the informant had performed 
his duty and provided correct information   not put him in the position 
in which he would have been if the incorrect information had been 
correct. That basic principle is illustrated in the numerous recent cases 
on negligent property valuations and explains the distinction between 
'no transaction' and 'successful transaction' situations drawn in those 
cases ..."
Robert Walker J (as he then was) had differed from Carnwath 
J as to the Ombudsman's power to compensate for distress and 
inconvenience, contrary to legal principle applied in the courts, 
but was unable to resist applying legal principle to limit the rest 
of the directions. This pronouncement was 'in Westminster City 
Council v Haywood [1998] Ch 377 (at p. 394), decided in 1996 
but reversed by the Court of Appeal in 1997 on a peculiar point 
of jurisdiction (since itself reversed by Statutory Instrument 
1997/308, reg. 9) leaving open not only compensating for 
distress but also the quoted statement of principle. Some may 
think this a legalistic principle inconsistent with the basic 
simplicity of 'such steps as he may specify'.
III 'Parliament has given very little assistance in defining precisely 
what kind of orders it is intended that the Ombudsman should be 
allowed to make, and in particular how far he is entitled to impose 
financial penalties going beyond those which would otherwise be 
applicable under the general law ...
Although the Ombudsman's powers of investigation are specifically 
made retrospective by the Act, I have serious doubts as to whether this 
extends to his power to make compensatory awards, in relation to 
matters which did not give rise to a legal liability at the time they took 
place. It would require clear words to create such retrospective liability, 
and I do not find such words in the Act.'
Carnwath J again in Duffield v Pensions Ombudsman [1996] OPLR 
149 (at pp. 154 and 158) citing himself. Although noting, in 
effect, that there is no statutory definition of 'steps' so that there 
are no express limitations on those which can be directed, he 
preferred to look for and find an absence of express extensions. 
In contrast, Lightman J has very recently recognised 
retrospectivity as to both potential liability and actual jurisdiction, 
saying: 'To find in social legislation of this character a form of 
retrospective protection against maladministration causing 
injustice is scarcely something which on grounds of fairness and 
reasonableness could not be expected of the legislature.' (in 
Westminster City Council v Haywood (No. 2), 20 December 1999, 
transcript para. 19; Dujfield was not referred to).
IV 'My own view, in the different context of a complaint against an 
employer in respect of maladministration causing injustice to members in
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participation in a transaction involving the improper payment out of 
sums which in large measure found their way, as they were from the 
outset intended to do, into the employer's hands, is that it would not be 
permissible for the Pensions Ombudsman to require the employer to 
refund the sums it received unless the court would be in a position to 
make such an order.'
Despite gratuitously imposing this limitation, Knox J actually 
upheld the directed refund in Hillsdown Holdings pic v Pensions 
Ombudsman [1997] 1 All ER 862 (quoted at p. 898). The 
imposition was made notwithstanding the fact, which he had 
noted, that 'there is no express limitation on the steps which the 
Pensions Ombudsman can direct to be taken or refrained from' 
(at p. 896)   so the steps directed could, he held, benefit non- 
complainants. He also supported compensation for distress, etc., 
but nonetheless could not swallow the possibility otherwise of 
the relief available from the Ombudsman being different from   
better than?   that available from the courts.
V 'IJ'nd it difficult to believe that Parliament intended that the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of maladministration 
should extend to tort claims of this nature and to overriding defences of 
limitation to such claims and that the respondent to the complaint 
should be deprived of the substantive and procedural safeguards of a trial 
before a judge. It is however unnecessary to decide this question in this 
case. I have only to decide whether the alleged ton was committed.'
Here Lightman J helpfully illuminated the depths of 
instinctive judicial prejudice against alternative   and therefore 
competitive?   dispute (or complaint) resolution in NHS Pensions 
Agency v Pensions Ombudsman (Re Beechinor) [1997] OPLR 99 (at 
para. 1). Then blissfully ignorant, apparently, of the time-limits 
and procedural requirements in fact provided (see SI 1995/1053 
and SI 1996/2475, reg. 5), his Lordship proceeded to reclassify 
the issue into court-bound litigation terms and then, ultimately, 
to decide it on a finding of fact (i.e. no breach of duty of care). 
Readers, if not judges, should appreciate that appeals only lie on 
points of law.
However, as to 'such steps as he may specify', Lightman J . 
particularly observed:
' ... if and so Jar as the Ombudsman can give damages Jor ton, a 
single sum could only be awarded representing the damages suffered at 
the date of the commission of the tort.' (at para. 8)
This limitation seems significantly adrift from the 
straightforward language of the statute, particularly in the 
context of 'pensions' (i.e. essentially periodical payments).
VI 'In a case in which the maladministration complained of consists 
of an alleged breach of trust, the Pensions Ombudsman has no power to 
direct remedial steps to be taken which are not steps that a court of law 
could properly have directed to be taken.'
Sir Richard Scott's only stated justification for this 
pronounced limitation was that he agreed with Knox J (i.e. in IV 
above: see Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [1998] Ch 512 at p. 520). 
The Court of Appeal, loyally upholding him, did not actually re- 
pronounce this limitation, although they did not explicitly 
renounce it either (at [1999] 4 All ER 546). Instead, that court 
reached conclusions regarding what cannot have been the 
intention of Parliament as to who would be bound by the 
Ombudsman's determinations (at p. 579) so as to pronounce, 
somewhat non-consequentially (at p. 580):
'We do not hold that, in the strict sense, there was an absence of 
jurisdiction to entenain the complaint: rather, that the Ombudsman, in 
the exercise of his discretion, should have declined to do so.'
Observations (by myself) as to the serious unacceptability of 
this belated, and out-dated, advice may be found in Pensions 
Management Institute News (September 1999). More significantly, 
the relevant minister (Jeff Rooker) has stated in a written 
answer:
'In order to ensure that the Pensions Ombudsman can continue to 
deal with the range of cases he had dealt with before the Edge decision, 
changes are required to the procedures under which he conducts his 
investigations.' (Hansard, House of Commons, 2 1 December 
1999)
These required changes, clarifying Parliament's intentions, 
have been introduced in the Child Support, Pensions and Social 
Security Bill (2000).
VII 'It was common ground before me that the ombudsman has 
power to award damages Jor distress; the appellant reserving the right to 
argue that he does not in a higher court ...
The second point taken was that the award was disproportionate and 
unreasonably high. As to this, there is no doubt that the proper level oj 
an award ofcompensation Jor distress must be a matter of law.'
Hart J was responsible for this rather astonishing assertion in 
Swansea City and County v Johnson [1999] 1 All ER 863 (at p. 877). 
Bearing in mind that the courts do not award compensation for 
distress (hence the reservation for a higher court), much less for 
distress caused by maladministration (which is not justiciable), 
how could there conceivably be any law on the proper level? 
Unless his lordship meant, which he patently did not, that the 
test was Wednesbury unreasonableness (see postscript below).
JUDICIAL ROLE?
The Pensions Ombudsman enjoys, by virtue of statute, an 
unlimited power to direct the taking (or not taking) of 'such steps 
as he may specify'. The courts dislike this power and have sought 
to limit it by reference to their own powers (but not, at least as 
yet, by reference to 'perversity' in the administrative law sense). 
The limitations thus attempted may seem of extremely doubtful 
legitimacy in the light of House of Lords' guidelines:
'... it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British 
Constitution, though largely unwritten, isfirmh/ based upon the 
separation of powers: Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interprets 
them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its 
members at the time perceive to be a defect or lacuna in the existing law 
... the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words 
that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that 
intention was, and giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the 
statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to 
invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its 
plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of 
doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.'
Lord Diplock said this in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 All 
ER 529 (at p. 541) where the Court of Appeal had purported to 
limit an unlimited immunity (in relation to trade disputes) but 
was unanimously reversed. Incidentally, no assistance as to 
Parliament's relevant intentions regarding the Pensions 
Ombudsman can be discerned from Hansard (i.e. under the
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principle in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593). Traders Ferry Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 1260 at pp. 1288-89):
So, are the words ''such steps as he may specify' plain and 
unambiguous? As a leading text book explained:
'... when the question is whether Parliament did or did not intend a 
particular result, the 'intention of Parliament' is what the statutory 
words mean to the normal speaker of English. Thejact that a judge feels 
confident that, had the situation before him been put to them, the 
members of the Parliament in which the statute was passed would have 
voted for a different meaning or for additional words is immaterial. ' 
(Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., 1995, by Professor John 
Bell and Sir George Engle).
The legitimate and responsible attitude for judges to adopt 
towards deliberately different dispute (or complaint) resolution 
by 'non-courts', such as the Pensions Ombudsman, was 
exemplified by Lord Chief Justice Goddard in relation to the 
legislation establishing rent tribunals:
"... it is clearly the intention of the Act and of these regulations that 
the tribunal may proceed and give a decision without hearing either 
party unless a party states that he wishes to be heard. Obviously, 
therefore, Parliament intended the procedure of these tribunals to be of 
the most informal nature. No court can proceed to hear a case without 
having some evidence before it, nor can it give any judgment affecting a 
person's rights to property unless that person not only is before the 
court, but also has an opportunity of cross-examining the other party. 
Parliament, however, has said that the ordinary procedures to which 
lawyers are accustomed shall not apply to these cases.' (in R v Brighton 
and Area Rent Tribunal ex pane Marine Parade Estates ( 1936) Ltd 
[1950] 1 All ER 946 at p. 949).
Despite his evident distaste for these inferior tribunals, Lord 
Chief Justice Goddard did not seek to super impose upon them 
any judicial limitations not to be found within the relevant 
legislation. Similarly it is submitted, respectfully of course, that 
judges hearing pensions appeals should suppress professional 
pride and prejudice, abandon invidious comparisons and simply 
allow the Ombudsman to do what the statute says   'he may 
direct... such steps as he may specify' (see p. 4 above). So long 
as the Ombudsman's choreography avoids Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, he should be supported, not restricted, as the 
person preferred by Parliament   instead of the courts   to 
resolve pensions complaints.
POSTSCRIPT
As to Wednesbury unreasonableness, in Edge ([1999] 4 All ER 
546 at p. 568 9) Chadwick LJ thought it 'worth calling to mind 
the seminal passages in the judgment of Lord Greene, Master of 
the Rolls, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 ... at pp. 228-231.' He then 
quoted at length before referring to it being 'not without 
significance' to compare the reason for choosing pension 
scheme trustees with the following passage:
'It is clear that the local authority are entrusted by Parliament with 
the decision on a matter which the knowledge and experience of that 
authority can best be trusted to deal with.'
All this leads to two observations. First, the respect this 
Chancery judge showed for Wednesbury may be thought unduly 
dated. Thus recently in the House of Lords Lord Cooke was less 
respectful (in R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex pane International
'It seems to me unfortunate that Wednesbury and some Wednesbury 
phrases have become established incantations in the courts cfthe UK 
and beyond. Wednesbury ... an apparently briefly-considered case, 
might well not be decided the same way today; and the judgment of 
Lord Greene MR twice uses the tautologousformula "so unreasonable 
that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it". Yet judges are 
entirely accustomed to respecting the proper scope of administrative 
discretions. In my respectful opinion they do not need to be warned off 
the course by admonitory warnings. When, in Secretary cf State for 
Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 
[1977] AC 1014, the precise meaning of "unreasonably" in an 
administrative context was crucial to the decision, the five speeches in the 
House of Lords, the three judgments in the Court of Appeal and the two 
judgments in the Divisional Court all succeeded in avoiding needless 
complexity. The simple test used throughout was whether the decision 
was one which a reasonable authority could reach.'
The application of such a simple, non-legalistic test in judging 
the steps he directs should cause no concern for the Pensions 
Ombudsman.
The second observation is that the judiciary ought to 
recognise more often that, like the local authority in Wednesbury 
(and unlike trustees or the courts), the Pensions Ombudsman is 
the office-holder entrusted by Parliament with his powers in 
respect of pension schemes. His exercise of those powers should 
not, therefore, be subject to their interference. Happily there is 
now a nice illustration.
In Legal &_ General Assurance Society Ltd v Pensions Ombudsman 
(judgment 3 November 1999; (1999) 95 (46)) one issue was the 
time limit for bringing a complaint. Primarily this is three years 
but:
'Where, in the opinion of the Pensions Ombudsman, it was 
reasonable for a complaint not to be made or a dispute not to be 
referred before the end of the period allowed ... the Pensions 
Ombudsman may investigate and determine that complaint or dispute if 
it is received by him in writing within suchfunher time as he considers 
reasonable.' (Personal and Occupational Pension Scheme (Pensions 
Ombudsman) Regulations 1996, reg. 5(3))
My office and I had accepted for investigation an otherwise 
out-of-time complaint. Was this Wednesbury unreasonableness on 
my part? Mr Justice Lightman outlined the facts and, with 
uncharacteristic hesitation, held (transcript para. 19):
7 do not think that the ... complaint was brought within afunher 
reasonable period, but I hesitate to hold that no sensible PO acting with 
due appreciation of his responsibilities would have held the period 
reasonable. Accordingly whilst I consider that the PO's decision 
is on the margins of rationality, with some hesitation I have 
concluded that I cannot disturb his decision on this ground.' 
(Emphasis added for the benefit of the judiciary generally!) @
Dr Julian Farrand QC LLD
Solicitor; The Pensions Ombudsman
This article was the basis for a lecture given to the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies on 24 February 2000.
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